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Epistemology Shock: English Professors Confront Science 
Ian Barnard 
Chapman University 
Jan Osborn 
Chapman University 
The shock of our title was precipitated by our diverse yet eerily congruent experiences as English 
professors teaching courses where we were confronted by students, colleagues, and dispositions 
entrenched in scientism, scientific disciplines, and a science-based understanding of the world. 
These confrontations, rooted in the continuing legacy of 18th Century Cartesian constructions of 
a mind/body duality, resonate with current STEM initiatives, with calls within our own field of 
rhetoric and composition for more quantitative scholarship to justify the field itself, and with the 
privileging of empirical research and science methodologies in the academy in general and 
elsewhere. An exhaustive list of examples of this encroachment would be impossible here, but 
the ones that impact our work most immediately include increasing demands for quantitative 
assessments of the programs and courses we teach; the exponentially accelerating imperatives of 
standardized testing in the K-12 schools that prepare our students; and the research grants we 
apply for whose applications insist on “executive summaries,” “deliverables,” and discussions of 
methodology, and assume equipment use as a major expenditure—concepts and research 
frameworks from business, science, and the social sciences that are often alien to our work as 
humanities scholars. And, indeed, these privilegings of science and scientific methodologies, 
these demands for numbers and “facts,” cannot be separated from the current denunciation of 
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“alternate facts” by liberals, however convenient it might be to imagine that some appeals to 
facticity are more righteous than others. 
 These are the contexts that we recognize form and impact our places in the academy and 
our work as teachers based in an English Department but working with students in many 
disciplines. Although we do gesture to some pedagogical possibilities at the end of this article, 
our purpose here is not primarily to pose classroom solutions for this privileging of science 
methodologies—the result of a science/humanities duality—but rather to excavate the ways in 
which this disposition manifests itself in our classes and impacts our students and us as English 
teachers, challenging our disciplinary/disciplined ways of thinking, writing, reading, teaching; 
and to think through the implications and consequences of these challenges. 
 As rhetoricians and scholars trained in the disciplines of English, and as college English 
teachers, we both value close critical readings of facts and figures; we believe that all discourse 
constructs and disseminates values, assumptions, and ideologies; we see qualitative research as 
an integral component of any project that claims to gloss human and non-human cultures; we 
connect reading and writing to understanding self and others, to empathy, to inquiry in a broad 
and open context. Yet the calls for “randomized control studies” suggest that such connections 
must be quantified, must be scientifically “validated,” that storytelling (whether fictional or 
nonfictional, novelistic or essayistic) as a means of making meaning is suspect, that “data” and 
“outcomes” and “measurement” is the only way to investigate and educate. Somehow, the very 
idea of liberal arts, of broadening a human being’s experiences and knowledge rather than 
“training” them for a profession, is suspect. What are our graduates going to do with a degree is 
THE CEA FORUM Winter/Spring 2017 
 
 
 
73 www.cea-web.org 
 
often the question. We, on the other hand, wonder who they are going to be. But is such a 
question even possible in this climate of big data and empirical studies and scientific 
methodologies?1  And how do we avoid giving ourselves over to be cogs in a wheel that appears 
to be grinding every more steadily toward a focus on “objectivity,” toward a scientism that has 
been roundly challenged by the humanities for centuries? Can our discipline continue to work 
with the subtle ways knowledge is produced and challenged if data mining is “becom[ing] the 
methodological norm in Humanities research” (Braidotti 4)? 
 
The World of Fact 
 Ian has been teaching an interdisciplinary upper division course with a critical animal 
studies theme, while Jan has been co-teaching a series of courses with a colleague from 
economics. In both cases, our courses have attracted students from a variety of majors, and we 
have struggled to effectively address students who parade “facts,” truth,” and the scientism that 
frames their disciplinary training to counter the world views and assertions forwarded by our 
humanities-informed texts and methodologies that value experience as evidence and that see the 
insights that artistic creation offers our understandings of “reality.” Often these students are 
completely uncritical of scientific discourses, treating them as transparent and factual, seemingly 
unaware of the ways in which these discourses are as much constructed as any other discourse, 
and of the critiques of scientific pretentions to objectivity that have been made by feminists, 
queer theorists, critical race theorists, critical legal scholars, poststructuralists, and even some 
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scientists over the past half a century (Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
celebrated its 50th anniversary edition three years ago).2 
 Ian’s critical animal studies course attracts students from a variety of majors, some of 
whom are simultaneously taking a course on evolution. The scientists, biologists, computer 
scientists, and business majors in the group are the most reluctant to abandon ideologies of 
scientific fact and objectivity, an unfortunate reflection on the other courses they are taking, or, 
at least, on their inability to assimilate in the short term ideas they are confronting in those 
courses that counter conventional wisdom about science, facts, and objectivity. A central tenet of 
Critical Animal Studies holds that the human/non-human animal divide is a historically and 
culturally specific construction, and that the representation of non-human animals across media 
and in and through human imaginations plays a pivotal role in undergirding this construction 
(see, e.g., DeMello). 
 Common tropes deployed to maintain a human/non-human animal hierarchy include 
those that draw on measurements of reason, intelligence, and self-consciousness in order to 
justify assertions of humans’ relatively greater achievements and worth compared to other 
animals, and, some would argue, to rationalize humans’ mistreatment of other animals. Some 
students in the class are simultaneously taking a course on evolution, and these, as well as other 
class members, seem non-plussed at Ian’s suggestion that designations of intelligence are not 
objective, and that depending on the criteria used, one could come to different conclusions about 
who or what is “intelligent” (never mind the question about whether intelligence should be a 
criterion for value in the first place). As Rosi Braidotti puts it, 
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 the humanist image of thought…sets the frame for a self-congratulating relationship of 
 Man to himself, which confirms the dominant subject as much in what he includes as 
 his core characteristics as in what he excludes as ‘other.’ (Braidotti 67). 
There is a self-perpetuating cycle of accreditation that begins when I assume (sometimes 
maliciously, sometimes out of ignorance) that x is valuable and important and ends when I 
conclude that y is less worthy because y lacks x. 
 At times, Ian felt themself swimming against a huge tide of disbelief. In a discussion of 
vegetarianism, the ways in which meat-eating is embedded as a normative practice in U.S. 
culture, and the ethical issues around humans determining what their pets eat, what is the 
humanities-trained social constructionist English professor to do when several high-performing 
students recite facts from their evolution class about the tooth structure of dogs that “prove” that 
dogs are designed to eat meat? Ian did not know how to respond, felt ill-equipped to respond, felt 
unable to speak to these students in the language of science that they are speaking, felt the 
teacher’s credibility slipping away... 
 Meanwhile, Jan has been co-teaching an innovative series of courses with a colleague 
from economics. Called Humanomics, the program grew out of an extended discussion of the 
fundamental disconnect, and often distrust, between scholars in the humanities and economics. 
In fact, Jan was especially chosen for this job because of their expertise and experience as a 
scholar and teacher in English. At the core of Humanomics courses is the concurrent reading of 
literature and economic texts3; question-based, round table discussions; and team teaching. 
However, while it sounds quite balanced to be exploring markets and exchange and ethics 
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through economics and humanities texts, an unstated (or at least never explicitly stated) 
perception of economics as fact and literature as fiction (or some odd antonym for facts) 
permeates the classroom. And this binary construction of the dialoging texts is not neutral: “fact” 
is always seen as having the upper hand. Adam Smith and Frederick Hayek and Michael Polanyi 
and Thomas Sowell are taken seriously—obviously their ideas are to be valued—while Jane 
Austen and John Milton and Emile Zola and Mohsin Hamid are suspect, just novelists, after all. 
Even in a program with the intention of working across disciplinary barriers, the intention of 
challenging the idea that economics is bereft of humanity, there is an underlying bias toward 
facts that devalues the “structure of feeling” (to use Raymond Williams’ term) valued as an 
analytic tool in English studies. Here, too, the accounting, business, marketing, and economics 
majors are reluctant to abandon ideologies of scientific fact and objectivity; maybe no surprise 
there, but when the sociology and political science and English majors get caught up in this bias, 
the strength of the objectivity forces is clear. And while the students and professors discuss the 
need for better understanding prosperity and markets through a capacity for questioning and 
broadening our perspectives of the world, it seems the voices that dominate are those that sound 
authoritative, that talk facts, as if they are disembodied from human beings. So much is in play 
here, hundreds of years of scientism, of believing that reason rather than myth or the imagination 
or the senses or intuition or emotion is the foundation for all knowing (Craig Smith 234). And of 
believing that “reason” is transparent and universal, rather than itself a historical and cultural 
construct. 
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 Working with a variety of majors in the Humanomics program, Jan has found that 
students—even those in the Humanities—talk about “facts” and “truth” as if they are inherent in 
the economics texts, allowing them to marginalize the literary texts they are reading at the same 
time. Jan has been struck by how this way of conceptualizing knowledge puts the locus of 
understanding outside the students themselves: “It’s there in the facts.” Students simply have to 
memorize these facts or call upon them in a paper and they will be knowledgeable, right? The 
possibility of ambiguity or of the worldview presented in literature as embodying knowledge or 
any kind of truth seems outside their epistemological frame. Some recent excerpts from student 
papers on Matt Ridley’s book on “how prosperity evolves,” The Rational Optimist, attest to 
facticity’s allure: 
• “There is no doubt that progress does not reverse itself and moves us forward in a 
positive way. Ridley uses facts to show this is the case” (1 October 2014). 
• “The view of the world through Wordsworth’s frame of reference is disheartening as 
he denigrates society for ‘getting and spending.’ However, the tension in 
Wordsworth’s poem is repudiated by the truth of reality, the progress in human 
economics” (30 September 2014). 
• “These humanities texts are outdated, some being written in the early 1800s. Due to 
this fact, it is reasonable to argue that Ridley is indeed correct on what makes a better 
society. . . . If society wants to continue to improve and increase personal wealth, 
trade and consumerism is indeed the reasonable choice” (1 October 2014). 
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• “Ridley examines situations based on factual evidence and statistics. . . . He would 
find Steinbeck’s work probably meaningful, but insignificant in his quest to prove 
why one should be a rational optimist” (27 September 2015). 
• “As so elegantly stated in Ridley’s well-reasoned and fact supported book, prosperity 
is a direct result of interdependence” (1 October 2014). 
• “Ridley views the world scientifically, and uses number, graphs, percentages and 
other data to get his point across. Thoreau views the world through his eyes alone” 
(23 September 2014). 
 Jan and Jan’s colleague in the university’s Economic Science Institute have attempted to 
challenge this scientism. In their course, Humanomics: Knowledge, Satire, and the Facts and 
Values of Economics, they include a chapter from A Culture of Fact: England, 1550-1720, where 
Barbara Shapiro explores the role of “fact” in the early modern period in England. Shapiro’s 
work demonstrates that “the concept ‘fact’ itself has undergone considerable modification over 
time” (1). Taking shape in the legal field, “fact” was concerned with “human actions or events” 
(9). In the legal context, matters of fact did not refer to “established truth” but to an issue of 
truth, a determination of what might be known without direct observation. Some matters of fact 
could be proven false. In fact, there were references to “false fact” (64). From this initial 
understanding, “fact” was transformed “from something that had to be sufficiently proved by 
appropriate evidence to be considered worthy of belief to something for which appropriate 
verification had already taken place” (31). Over time, a culture of fact developed, one where the 
concept of “fact” was transferred to the natural world. “Fact,” which began as an epistemological 
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process, was transformed into an impermeable conclusion of science, of rationality, of 
empiricism, a term reserved for “certain knowledge” (77). This concept of fact was satirized by 
Swift as early as 1726: 
 As these noble Houyhnhnms are endowed by Nature with a general Disposition to 
 all Virtues, and have no Conceptions or Ideas of what is evil in a rational Creature; 
 so their grand Maxim is, to cultivate Reason, and to be wholly governed by it. Neither 
 is Reason among them a Point Problematical as with us, where Men can argue with 
 Plausibility on both Sides of a Question; but strikes you with immediate Conviction; as 
 it must needs do where it is not mingled, obscured, or discoloured by Passion and 
 Interest... because Reason taught us to affirm or deny only where we are certain; and 
 beyond our Knowledge we cannot do either. (255) 
Polanyi refers to the phenomenon Swift satirizes and that we have seen in our classes discussed 
here as “scientific detachment” (vii). He establishes the concept of personal knowledge, a way of 
knowing that “transcends the disjunction between subjective and objective” (300). The personal 
acknowledges requirements independent of itself (use of a word, for example) while 
acknowledging commitment of the self—realizing that “it is not the words that have meaning, 
but the speaker who means something by them” (252). This way of conceiving of knowledge is 
central to rhetorical studies and to the Humanities in general. Knowledge is personal, is created, 
is multiple and dynamic. Knowledge for many of our students is outside the self; knowledge is 
objective; and since they see science as “objective” and literature as “subjective,” they have 
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embraced scientism and positivism as their epistemological framework. There is no participation 
in the act of knowing in this epistemology; there is authority. 
 An attempt to challenge this dichotomy through Humanomics courses is a complicated 
task, as illustrated most obviously in the student papers excerpted above where the authority of 
the economic texts is reflected. Like Miles Corwin in his narrative of an economics professor 
who caught him reading a book during class, student work often reflects the assumption that the 
economic texts are where the knowledge resides. Even though they have an economics professor 
who values literature, students’ reliance on the economic texts for support is paramount. The 
business/econ/science students have not yet, like Corwin’s economics professor, “come to the 
conclusion that [their] education was narrow and incomplete,” that “university officials who de-
emphasized the humanities, and students who dismissed their significance, were misdirected” 
(Corwin 38). 
 
The World of Fiction 
 We must interrogate the quantitative worldview by asking our students and colleagues “if 
we are incapable of integrating multiple ways of knowing” and “whether the products of 
scientific inquiry are the only guideposts to aid our progress” (Elaine Harding). J. M. Coetzee 
offers such an interrogation in his foundational, genre-bending, interdisciplinary, and self-
reflexive animal studies text, the “novel” The Lives of Animals. The book offers an instructive 
allegory of the value of Jan and Ian’s humanities knowledge and education, and of how we might 
productively use this knowledge and education to intervene into scientific and other discourses, 
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as urged by Braidotti in her meditation on the place of the (post)humanities in posthuman 
educational and social institutions.4  Coetzee’s text ends with a terrible coming together of 
reason and emotion. John Bernard, a professor of physics and astronomy, is dropping his novelist 
mother off at the airport after her rather tumultuous visits to his campus, during which she speaks 
and debates passionately about the ethics of meat eating, amongst other animal-related topics. 
Elizabeth Costello, the novelist, is haunted—tormented—by the hideous lives and deaths of 
animals created and killed in the factory farming industries that produce meat for human 
consumption and by the humans around her, including her son and his wife, Norma, who 
explicitly or implicitly collude in the recurring Holocaust (Coetzee infamously compared the 
quotidian human slaughter of animals for food to the Nazi Holocaust). Costello says to her son, 
 “I look into your eyes, into Norma’s, into the children’s, and I see only kindness, 
 human-kindness. Calm down, I tell myself, you are making a mountain out of a 
 molehill. This is life. Everyone else comes to term with it, why can’t you? Why can’t 
 you?” 
  She turns on him a tearful face. What does she want, he thinks? Does she want me 
 to answer her question for her? 
  They are not yet on the expressway. He pulls the car over, switches off the engine, 
 takes his mother in his arms. He inhales the smell of cold cream, of old flesh. 
 “There, there,” he whispers in her ear. “There, there. It will soon be over.” (69) 
The “it” of the last sentence is ambiguous—the word could refer to Costello’s visit with her son, 
her present agony, or her life, or any individual human life, or human suffering, or non-human 
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suffering, or life in general, amongst other possibilities. But in all cases, her son’s response 
attempts to placate her with the promise of “its” temporary nature, completely skirting the actual 
subject of her pain and also not engaging her deep emotion. He doesn’t speak of family, of love, 
of life, of animals. He doesn’t speak of his feelings, of his feelings for his mother. The ambiguity 
of the “it” is symptomatic of his inability to engage his mother beyond the general and 
superficial. The reductiveness of John’s response to his mother is glossed by the shorter 
sentences and phrases that ventriloquize his point of view: Elizabeth’s opening sentences in this 
passage are quite lyrical and comprise multiple different kinds of phrases. John, on the other 
hand, is represented by staccato phrases, many in simple subject-verb-object form: “He pulls the 
car over, switches off the engine, takes his mother in his arms. He inhales the small of cold 
cream.” 
 John the scientist’s inadequate response to his mother’s pain, his refusal to engage it, 
could represent reason’s inadequacy in the face of great emotion, reason’s inability to capture the 
heterogeneity of consciousness and experience (recent critiques in composition studies of the 
over-attention to logos at the expense of pathos suggest that rhetoric has also not escaped 
reason’s hold5), and the subterfuges, displacements, and violences that are performed under the 
sway of the ideology of reason. Indeed, during her debate with a philosopher at her son’s college, 
Costello powerfully renounces reason “if reason is what sets me apart from the veal calf.” Which 
brings us back to the argument about intelligence and humans at the top of the pyramid of animal 
life. In What is Posthumanism?, animal studies scholar Cary Wolfe points to the circularity of 
using the very criteria to privilege humans that should be under scrutiny in the first place: “our 
THE CEA FORUM Winter/Spring 2017 
 
 
 
83 www.cea-web.org 
 
shared embodiment, mortality, and finitude make us … 'fellow creatures' in ways that subsume 
the more traditional markers of ethical consideration such as the capacity for reason, the ability 
to enter into contractual agreements or reciprocal behaviors, … markers that have traditionally 
created an ethical divide between Homo sapiens and everything (or everyone) else” (62). The 
same could be said of the divide between the “scientific” and the “unscientific”—we cannot 
deploy as a yardstick to evaluate the relative merits of the two sides of the divide the very 
construction that was used to create the divide in the first place. And, indeed, as Cora Diamond 
points out, critics who read Coetzee’s text only as an argument for animal rights and miss his 
presentation of Costello herself as haunted, as a wounded animal, fall prey to the very privileging 
of Cartesian logic that Costello (and the text) critique. The book The Lives of Animals includes 
Coetzee’s Princeton University Tanner Lectures (Coetzee read his “novel” as the “Lectures,” the 
latter called “The Lives of Animals”) followed by “essays” by four prominent intellectuals 
responding to Coetzee’s lectures. Some of the four struggle with how to respond to “lectures” in 
the form of a “novel,” some simply address Elizabeth Costello’s argument and ignore Coetzee’s 
art, as if that art in itself weren’t a type of argument, and as if that art in itself hasn’t shaped the 
way we see and hear and respond to Costello and what she represents. 
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Pulling Back the Curtain 
 How are we (Jan and Ian, but also English faculty, humanities faculty, and all teachers) to 
respond when we are confronted with Costello’s naysayers in our own classrooms? 
Should we assert ever more forcefully the value of the humanities and humanities-based 
knowledge and ways of knowing the world? Should we study up in the sciences on the topics of 
our courses in order to meet our students on their own turf and embody the interdisciplinarity 
that we like to pay lip service to? 
 Coetzee’s text suggests a different path. The Lives of Animals takes the form of fiction (a 
fiction that reenacts Coetzee’s first presentation of the fiction as “lectures” at Princeton 
University)—this genre choice is itself a testament to the capacity of art to do what science may 
not be able to do. Perhaps Coetzee’s decision to present lectures-in-fiction or fiction-as-lectures 
speaks to fiction’s power and possibilities? It seems our most scientifically-minded students 
intuitively see or feel the power of art or the inadequacy of science to express, analyze, and 
respond to particular texts, ideas, emotions, and feelings barely articulable. How else to explain 
why some of the strongest of these students developed creative final projects (stories, photo 
series) in Ian’s animal studies class when given free choice of genre and medium for the final 
project? Were they yearning for an alternate form of expression? Was this a way for them to 
express creativity and subjectivity in a socially- and academically-sanctioned way? Was it 
perhaps an unconscious acknowledgment of the impossibility of neutral, objective, or value-free 
inquiry? For the same students who chose to work on “creative” projects questioned and attacked 
class members who wrote essays, excoriating them as “too subjective” or “not subjective 
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enough”—almost as if the students who opted for creative projects did so to avoid the very 
policing of subjectivity that they subjected the essay writers to, secure in their knowledge that 
creative work was by definition subjective and thus believing it immune to this kind of scrutiny. 
And, of course, these students’ retreats from writing essays and their misguided assumptions 
about essays, also point toward the terrible ways in which English and other teachers have 
constructed the academic essay as objective, impersonal, and distant.6 
 Having students across the disciplines actually do creative work is certainly one way to 
invite them to experience effects and affects that other modes of production might not offer. But 
we also want to bridge the apparent disconnect between students’ intellectual positions and their 
unconscious understandings and embodied experiences. We want to bring the questions 
regarding ways of knowing to their attention, asking questions of their “facts,” creating 
opportunities for seeing multiple perspectives, for explicating various epistemological 
affiliations, and for students to learn to identify and analyze their own affiliations, and to 
recognize them as affiliations. But in doing so, do we run the risk of suggesting that these diverse 
value systems form a pluralistic free for all? How do we encourage our scientific students and 
colleagues to question their allegiances to “facts” without, at the same time, implying that their 
opponents need to take facticity seriously? 
 Perhaps these questions themselves could become discussion topics in class, rather than 
solely the basis of our behind-the-scenes hand wringing? By involving students in these debates, 
we would not only be inviting them into our scholarly community (see Graff) but also showing 
them how these questions are parts of larger conflicts around epistemology, knowledge, 
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scholarship, and teaching; questions that are not settled, that resist the comfort of facile right and 
wrong answers; but also questions that are an exciting and integral component of the critical 
thinking that should form the core of their education.7 
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Notes 
1 For a critical take on big data, see O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data 
Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy. 
2 For a concise recent summary of these critiques, see Braidotti Chapter 1. In some of the now 
classic earlier scholarship, Sandra Harding, Donna Haraway, Vernon Rosario, and Trinh T. 
Minh-ha have pointed, in particular, to the gendered and racialized nature of science’s supposed 
universality and of people’s trust in science. In Decolonizing Methodologies, Linda Tuhiwai 
Smith argues that the privileging of reason and logic are peculiar to Western cultures, and that 
these values are hostile to many indigenous cultures. For a pointed exposé of the ways scientific 
discourses can use the mantel of “expertise” to occlude vacuity, see Montague’s “How to Win 
Any Argument: Pseudo-Scientific Neuro-Gibberish,” a worthy riposte to the Sokal scandal, the 
supposed exposé of cutting-edge scholars’ empty poststructuralist jargon that gripped academe in 
the 1990s when Social Text published a “nonsensical” article on quantum gravity. 
3 The pairings include, for example, Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath with Ridley’s The 
Rational Optimist, Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels and Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge, Stephenson’s 
Snow Crash and McCloskey’s Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can’t Explain the Modern 
World, Zola’s Germinal and Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty, Dostoevsky’s The Brothers 
Karamazov and Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
4 Other examples of such cross-disciplinary interventions that come to mind include the field of 
critical legal studies, where close readings of legal discourses was often undertaken by literary 
scholars crossing disciplinary boundaries; and the ways in which ACT UP and other AIDS 
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activists used rhetorical skills (both in their “reading” of official discourses and in their own 
representations of themselves, the AIDS crisis, and AIDS as a disease) and self-education to 
challenge the authority of scientific, medical, and governmental institutions in the US during the 
1980s and 90s. In both cases, humanistic training, sensibility, and skills were used to critically 
interrogate and even reimagine non-humanities disciplines and discourses. 
5 See, e.g., Worsham. For a recent discussion of emotion in the humanities and humanities 
scholarship more generally, see the PMLA special issue on emotion (130.5). The rise of Donald 
Trump is surely a powerful lay illustration of the dangers of underestimating the power of 
pathos, of assuming that voters would make logos-informed decisions, of the failure (on the part 
of pollsters, political commentators, and Hillary Clinton) to adequately account for the role of 
pathos in directing people’s imaginations and moving them to action. 
6 For some classic and recent critiques of the ways in which the essay form is conventionally 
constructed in college composition classes, and of the privileging of this version of the essay in 
composition pedagogy, see Annas, Banks, Faris, Fort, Sirc, Weathers, Worsham. These critiques 
also connect to scholarship that is critical of the dominant Western-centered (and Aristotle-
originating) construction of rhetorical history in the US (e.g., Baca, Powell). 
7 We thank Holly Batty, Aneil Rallin, Morgan Read-Davidson, and Bart J. Wilson for suggesting 
ideas and resources that helped us shape this article. We are also grateful to the anonymous 
College English Association Forum reviewer for their feedback on an earlier version of this 
article. 
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